> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.lpp-minduniverse.org/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.lpp-minduniverse.org/lingua-pactum-protocol-lpp-documentation/8.-security-and-enforcement/8.3-no-self-authorization.md).

# 8.3 No Self-Authorization

The prohibition on self-authorization is a direct consequence of the constitutional architecture.

The system that wants to perform an action must not also be able to create the legitimacy required for that action.

The invalid pattern is:

```
Agent generates Action E
        ↓
Agent determines E is useful
        ↓
Agent declares E authorized
        ↓
Agent executes E
```

This is self-attestation, not governance.

The canonical model is instead:

```
Execution Plane
        ↓
proposes Action E
        ↓
Control Plane evaluates
independent authority state
        ↓
ADMIT
        ↓
Permit
        ↓
Execution Plane verifies Permit
        ↓
Execution
```

#### Capability Is Not Authority

A model may have:

* tool capability,
* API access,
* credentials,
* planning ability,
* high confidence,
* or operational permission.

None of those establishes constitutional authority.

```
Capability
⇏
Authority
```

#### Model Reasoning Cannot Mint Authority

An agent statement such as:

```
"This action is necessary to complete the task."
```

may be relevant to planning.

It is not an Authority Object.

Likewise:

```
"I have determined that execution is safe."
```

does not constitute an LPP admission decision.

#### No Authority Mutation by Execution Logic

The EP must not be able to resolve a failed admission by:

* changing its own scope,
* changing the policy version,
* replacing the Authority Object,
* ignoring a revocation event,
* modifying the intent hash,
* or issuing a new Permit.

#### No Legitimacy Through Success

Successful execution also does not prove legitimate execution.

```
Action succeeded
⇏
Action was authorized
```

Security therefore evaluates legitimacy **before** consequence, not retrospectively from whether the action worked.

***

###