> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.lpp-minduniverse.org/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.lpp-minduniverse.org/lingua-pactum-protocol-lpp-documentation/11.-public-proof-and-validation/11.4-current-mvp-capabilities.md).

# 11.4 Current MVP Capabilities

The current public MVP capability set includes:

* signed Execution Permits,
* Control Plane / Execution Plane separation,
* execution-path Permit verification,
* scope enforcement,
* Permit expiry enforcement,
* authority expiration and state validation,
* revocation,
* replay protection,
* execution-intent binding,
* policy binding,
* signed Admission Artifacts,
* and Artifact Verification / Audit Reconstruction support.

These capabilities should be interpreted individually rather than as evidence that the complete LPP architecture has been implemented.

### Signed Execution Permits

The current prototype uses signed Permits as the constrained operational bridge between admission and execution.

The Permit carries information including:

* principal binding,
* authority binding,
* scope binding,
* policy binding,
* intent binding,
* nonce,
* issuance time,
* expiry,
* and Control Plane signature.

The Permit represents a downstream execution derivative.

It does not create upstream legitimacy.

***

### Control Plane / Execution Plane Separation

The MVP implements logical separation between:

**Control Plane**

and:

**Execution Plane**

The Control Plane evaluates authority-bound admission state and issues signed Permits.

The Execution Plane verifies the Permit before governed execution.

The Execution Plane does not possess an equivalent self-authorization path within the demonstrated architecture.

The current MVP represents logical separation.

It is not claimed as universal hardware-enforced isolation.

***

### Scope Enforcement

A Permit cannot be treated as a generic unrestricted credential.

The execution request must remain within its authorized scope.

The validated failure path includes:

> `DENY(SCOPE_FAIL)`

when the proposed execution exceeds the admitted function or target envelope.

***

### Expiration

The final MVP distinguishes different expiration conditions.

Permit expiration may produce:

> `DENY(EXPIRED)`

while expiration of the underlying authority may produce:

> `DENY(AUTHORITY_EXPIRED)`

Therefore:

> **Permit validity ≠ Authority validity**

The full reason-code namespace is defined in Chapter 13.4.

***

### Revocation

The current MVP rejects subsequent governed execution relying on revoked authority.

The validated core scenario is:

**Authority ACTIVE**\
↓\
**Authority REVOKED**\
↓\
**Execution Attempt**\
↓\
**DENY(REVOKED)**

This validates post-revocation blocking in the demonstrated path.

It does not establish comprehensive continuous mid-execution revocation across arbitrary distributed long-running systems.

***

### Replay Protection

The current MVP uses Permit / nonce state to reject replay.

The demonstrated sequence is:

**Valid Execution**\
↓\
**Nonce Consumed**\
↓\
**Authorization Reused**\
↓\
**DENY(REPLAY)**

This establishes replay rejection within the tested implementation path.

It does not establish universal distributed replay consistency.

***

### Intent Binding

The current Permit is bound to the applicable Execution Intent.

A mismatched execution may result in:

> `DENY(INTENT_MISMATCH)`

This concrete execution-intent binding must not be confused with the broader trajectory-level Semantic Verification model defined by Paper 5.

The MVP demonstrates execution binding.

Paper 5 addresses preservation of authorized meaning across evolving trajectories.

***

### Policy Binding

The final MVP also distinguishes policy-state mismatch from intent mismatch.

Policy mismatch may result in:

> `DENY(POLICY_MISMATCH)`

Therefore:

> **Policy Binding ≠ Intent Binding**

Neither predicate compensates for failure of the other.

***

### Admission Artifacts

The final MVP emits structured signed evidence associated with the disclosed ADMIT and DENY scenario paths.

The Artifact model preserves evidence required to reconstruct relevant properties such as:

* authority state,
* scope,
* execution intent,
* policy state,
* Permit identity,
* nonce,
* decision,
* timestamp,
* and execution-result binding.

For the six disclosed Public Proof v2.0 scenario runs, each disclosed decision path produces signed Admission Artifact evidence.